Abstract-One of the major limitations of index based encrypted string search on big dataset is the inherent problem of big index generation, maintenance and update which stops it from being dynamic in a sense that one could not modify data or add or remove keywords. Also for a resource constraint client, to generate an index linear in the size of big dataset is difficult. In this paper, we provide an efficient easy-toimplement public key based searchable encryption scheme for string search which is adaptively secure and does not need any index. We provide concrete proof of the adaptive security of our scheme against honest-but-curious server. We validate our scheme against three different publicly available datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent past, searchable encryption (SE) has unfolded as a crucial research domain at the intersection of cryptography and secure cloud computing. SE allows one party to outsource the storage of its data to another party (a cloud) privately while enabling to search selectively over it. Since huge volumes of documents are stored in a cloud server, searching against a keyword may result into large number of documents, most of which are not intended, causing unnecessary network traffic. This motivates the idea of searching against a string, which allows the search to be more specific.
Although few works are available in the literature involving string search (e.g. [1] - [4] ), but all of them are based on index based searching using SSE and none of them are adaptively secure and expose lots of informations to the server following the search. Our Contributions :
1. In [5] , authors proposed PEKS scheme for keyword search. We extend their construction and propose an adaptively secure PEKS scheme for string search which takes one round of communication and O(n) times of computation over n documents. 2. Our scheme is at the intersection of partially homomorphic public key encryption and PEKS. The partial homomorphic property is used to detect adjacency of words which is crucial for string identification (see Remark 1) . We observe that unlike fully homomorphic system, a partially homomorphic system will suffice and also gives reasonable performance. 3. We provide a formal proof to show that the scheme is adaptively secure. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first SE scheme for string search which is adaptively secure. 4. We validate our scheme using three different datasets (the speech data, English text data and DNS records). 5. With SSE based search, additional computation is needed for index maintenance with subsequent modification of data. However, with this new scheme of string search, no such additional computation is needed.
II. RELATED WORKS
For the last ten years, searchable encryption has been the focus for many leading research groups and several results were proposed [5] - [17] . In [13] , authors defined computational and statistical relaxations of the existing notion of perfect consistency and provided a new scheme that was statistically consistent. In [12] authors presented as-strongas-possible definitions of privacy and some constructions for public-key based encryption schemes where the encryption algorithm is deterministic. The work in [12] also generalizes their methods to obtain a notion of efficiently searchable encryption schemes which permit more flexible privacy to search-time trade-offs via a technique called bucketization. In [5] , authors studied the problem of searching on data that is encrypted using a public key system which they referred to as PEKS and provided several constructions. In [15] , authors show how to create a public-key encryption scheme that allows PIR (private information retrieval) searching over encrypted documents. In [14] , authors defined and solved the problem of privacy-preserving multi-keyword ranked search over encrypted data in cloud computing (MRSE).
Dynamic SSE was first considered by Song et al. [7] , but no solution with sublinear search time existed before the work in [18] . Recently, two new dynamic SSE schemes have been proposed. The first one, by Cash et al. [10] , which is an extension of [8] . In [8] , authors presented another efficient SSE scheme which supports complex queries involving multiple keywords. Similar scheme may be found in [9] . In [19] , authors studied the trade-off between locality and server storage size of SSE schemes. In [6] , authors introduced the idea of symmetric searchable encryption (SSE) with improved security definitions.
In [16] authors studied the security provided by various encrypted databases and presented a series of attacks that recover the plaintext from encrypted database columns using only the encrypted column and publicly-available auxiliary information. In [9] , authors studied efficient sub linear search techniques for arbitrary Boolean queries. In [11] , Stefanov et al. designed a scheme for the first time to address forward secrecy. In [7] , the search complexity is linear in the number of documents stored in the database.
In [1] - [4] , SSE schemes are developed for string search. With these schemes searching is done based on some secure index which is generated by client and stored at the cloud. The size of the index is as large as the dataset. Cryptographic Primitives: Here we define cryptographic primitives that are needed for our SSE scheme for string search.
III. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
We typically denote an arbitrary negligible function by negl such that for any arbitrary polynomial p(.), there exists an integer a such that for all λ > a, negl(λ) < 1 p(λ) [20] . In addition, we use massage authentication code, MAC k (.) [20] which outputs in λ bits. We treat these outputs as elements of Z p where p is a λ bit prime. We also use pseudo prime number generator [21] , denoted by P P NG ( 
, we write g b to express the λ-bit representation of g. We now formally define bilinear map using G 1 , G 2 and G 3 which will be helpful to formalize the security proof of our scheme. 
Two cryptographic hash functions are used in out scheme π pss , namely H 1 and H 2 which are as follows:
and H 2 are realized using MAC() as follows:
where k is the key.
In our scheme we denote the key (session key) as k s and for simplicity of expression we write H 1 (k s , w) and
IV. OUR SCHEME In this section we present our SSE scheme Π ss for string search. The Construction: Now we provide the actual algorithms for key generation (Algorithm 1), PEKS encryption (Algorithm 2), trapdoor generation (Algorithm 3) and searching (Algorithm 4).
Scheme 1 (Π pss
(p, G 1 , G 2 , G 3 , g 1 , h, g 2 , a, k s ) ← KeyGen(1 λ ).
Algorithm 1 Keygen
Input security parameter λ. Correctness of the PEKS encryption of our scheme is easy to realize from the following lemma. 
Lemma 1 (Correctness
if (counter = 1) then k ← 2; while (k ≤ l) do j ← 1; while (j ≤ listA.length) do if [(listA[j] = A × g 1 ) && (H 2 (e(listA[j], t j )) = listB[j])] then A = A ×
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we show that our scheme is secure against adaptive string attack. We first define an experiment for any PEKS scheme π = (KeyGen, P EKS Enc, T rapdoor, Search), any adversary A, and any value k of the security parameter. 
Definition 3. [Game Adaptive
A,π (1 k )]
Definition 4. A PEKS scheme, denoted by π = (KeyGen, P EKS Enc, T rapdoor, Search), is said to be adaptively secure under chosen plain text attack if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl such that P r[Game Adaptive
A,π (1 k ) = 1] ≤ 1 2 + negl(k),
where the probability is taken over the random coins used by A, as well as the random coins used in the game.
In the next theorem, we prove that our scheme π pss is adaptively secure. Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem(BDH): Let g 1 and g 2 be the generators of G 1 and G 2 respectively and a, b, c ∈ Z p such that a = bc, b = ac and c = ab. The BDH problem is as follows: given g 1 , g 2 , a.g 1 , a.g 2 , b.g 1 , b.g 2 , c.g 1 , c. , where e is the base of natural logarithm.
Let g 1 and g 2 be the generators of G 1 and G 2 respectively. Let the simulator S is given g 1 , g 2 
The simulator S simulates the challenger and interacts with the adversary A as follows: 
A produces a pair of challenge strings s 0 = (w 0,1 , . . . , w 0,m ) and s 1 = (w 1,1 , . . . , w 1,m ) which are of same length, say, m.
For i = 0 and 1, let the corresponding entries in
λ . IV A can continue to issue trapdoor queries for strings other than s 0 and s 1 .
It may be noted that the challenge implicitly defines H 1 (w b,1 )) ). Now, b e(p 1 , q 3 ) as its guess for abc.e(g 1 , g 2 ) , where a b is the value used in the challenge phase. A must have issued the query for either s 0 or s 1 as otherwise A's view on the PEKS will be independent of s 0 or s 1 and thus A cannot have the advantage of in breaking the scheme. Therefore with probability
, and then S outputs
Let ε 1 be the event denoting that S does not abort while A is making trapdoor queries. Then,
Let ε 2 be the event denoting S does not abort while A is making challenge. Then, P [ε 2 ] ≥ 1 nT (see APPENDIX B). Let ε 3 be the event denoting A queried against at least one of the strings s 0 and s 1 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Now we provide complexity analysis of our scheme in next two lemmas. + (l − 1) . Now we provide performance results of our proposed scheme Π ss based on three different datasets.The comparison of performances and storages of various schemes with that of Π ss can be found in Table I . We build a search engine based on the scheme Π ss using java in linux platform. The implementation is done on Asus A Series Core i3 laptop ((4 GB/ 1 TB HDD) 90NB0652-M32310 XX2064D). We use java based 'Jpair' library for the cryptographic primitives, namely 'Elliptic Curve'.
A. Speech Data
The TIMIT speech corpus [TIMIT] of speech was collected in 1993 as a speech data resource for acoustic phonetic studies and has been used extensively for the development and evaluation of automatic speech recognition systems (ASR). Figure 1 illustrates the time needed to generate PEKS ciphers for the speech data. In Figure1 we plot the time (in seconds along Y-axis) needed to encrypt documents (along X-axis). It may be noted that the graph reflects a linear growth with the increase in number of documents. Also the time needed for encrypting 200 documents is 150 seconds. Figure 2 represents the performance of searching over encrypted data. Here also we plotted time of search in seconds along Y-axis against the number of encrypted documents which are plotted along X-axis. This graph also shows a linear growth with the increase of number of encrypted documents with a maximum of 70 seconds needed to search over 200 encrypted documents. 
C. DNA Data
We have implemented our algorithm for searching sequences of SNP's (Single Nucleotide Polymorphism) in large genome databases which is available at [23] . SNP represents a difference in a nucleotide which is a single DNA building block. collection of encrypted documents with a server for future search. In this paper we revisited the PEKS construction of [5] and proposed a new PEKS scheme Π pss for string search. We have shown that our scheme is secure under the adaptive indistinguishability definition. We provide performance results of our proposed scheme Π ss based on three different commercial datasets [22]- [24] . We provide comparison of performances and storages of various schemes with that of Π ss in Table I. APPENDIX A Let ε 1 be the event denoting S does not abort while A is making trapdoor queries. Since in list 1 , the distribution of c i 's are independent of the distribution of h i 's, so P [one trapdoor query triggering abort] = From the assumption on negl(λ) (see Definition 4),
Thus P [ε 3 ] ≥ 2 .
